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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL L. RUSHTON, : 
Applicant/Appellant : 
: Supreme Court No. 8600095 
vs. : 
: Industrial Comm. No.: 
GELCO EXPRESS and EMPLOYERS : 85 000816 
MUTUAL LIABILITY OF WAUSAU, : 
: Category 6 
Defendants/Respondents: 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The sole issue on appeal is whether there is 
sufficient competent evidence in the record to sustain the 
findings of the Administrative Law Judge, which findings were 
affirmed by the Commission on February 3, 1986. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
On December 27, 1983, while in the course and scope 
of her employment, appellant slipped and fell in the parking 
lot of her employer. She subsequently filed an Application for 
Hearing before the Industrial Commission claiming both 
temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. 
Following a medical panel evaluation of the appellant, the 
Administrative Law Judge ordered the respondents to pay all of 
the appellant's reasonable medical expenses incurred as a 
result of the accident plus temporary total disability benefits 
from December 27, 1983 through August 31, 1984. He denied the 
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appellant's claim for permanent partial disability benefits. 
The Commission affirmed the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge on February 3, 1986 and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On December 27, 1983, the appellant slipped on 
ice and snow in the parking lot of her employer and fell to her 
hands and knees. (R. at 2). 
2. After this fall, appellant began experiencing 
pain in her upper back, neck and arms. (R. at 2). 
3. Appellant reported the accident to her employer 
and was paid temporary total disability benefits from December 
28, 1983 to August 26, 1984. In addition, medical payments 
were made on her behalf in the amount of $3,141.23. (R. at 2, 
74). 
4. On September 13, 1984, appellant filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission. In the 
Application, appellant claimed additional temporary total plus 
permanent partial disability benefits for an injury to her 
back. (R. at 25) . 
5. Prior to the date appellant filed her 
application, three different doctors had indicated that her 
condition was medically stable and she could return to work. 
(R. at 7, 15, 19) . 
6. In October 1984, approximately ten months after 
her fall, appellant began to complain of pain in her knees to 
Dr. Gordon R. Kimball. (R. at 35). 
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7. X-rays of appellant's knees revealed a lateral 
riding patella which Dr. Kimball diagnosed as "bilateral 
traumatic chondromalacia of the patella secondary to the 
accident." (R. at 35). 
8. Dr. Kimball further stated, however, that 
although he suspected the accident caused the appellant's knee 
problems, argument on this issue was highly likely. (R. at 35) . 
9. Objective tests performed on the appellant 
included a CT scan of her cervical spine, an EMG, x-rays of 
her neck and a bone scan. The results of all of these tests 
were normal with the exception of a "slight reversal of the 
normal cervical ordodic curve in the mid portion of the 
cervical spine." (R. at 7, 34, 35). 
10. Appellant was eventually referred for evaluation 
to a medical panel appointed by the Commission. The medical 
panel found appellant was temporarily totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial accident through August 1984. It also 
determined that appellant had suffered no permanent partial 
disability as a result of the industrial accident. (R. at 41, 
42) . 
11. On December 31, 1985, the Administrative Law 
Judge issued a Supplemental Order in response to the 
appellant's Motion for Review. Therein he adopted the findings 
of the medical panel with regard to the issues of appellant's 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability. 
(R. at 76). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The findings of the Industrial Commission cannot be 
overturned on appeal in the absence of a showing that its 
findings are arbitrary and capricious. Findings are not 
arbitrary and capricious where they are supported by 
substantial competent evidence. In the instant case, the 
evidence in the record is clearly sufficient to support the 
findings of the Commission, therefore, its order must be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CANNOT 
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL SO LONG AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-84 (1953 as amended) 
provides that upon review of an order of the Industrial 
Commission, the Supreme Court may affirm or set aside the 
award. However, an award may only be set aside upon the 
following grounds: 
(1) That the Commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the 
award. 
The standard of review identified in §35-1-84 is 
a limited one as is evidenced by the decision in Blaine v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985). 
Therein the Court stated: 
This Court has interpreted the foregoing statutory 
standard [§35-1-84] on numerous occasions and 
has concluded that the Commission's findings are 
not to be displaced in the absence of a showing 
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that they are arbitrary and capricious. (Footnote 
omitted). 
Id. at 1086. Findings of the Commission are deemed to be 
arbitrary and capricious only where there is no substantial 
competent evidence to support them. This fact is illustrated 
by the decision in Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1965) where the following comment 
was made: 
This Court cannot properly reverse the Commission 
and compel an award unless there is credible 
evidence without substantial contradiction which 
points so clearly and persuasively in plaintiff's 
favor that failure to so find would justify the 
conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or 
refusing to believe the evidence. 
See also Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 
431 P.2d 794, 796 (1967). In the instant case, there is no 
question but that there is substantial competent evidence in 
the record to support the findings and order of the 
Administrative Law Judge. Thus, the decision of the Commission 
must not be disturbed. 
A. The Administrative Law Judge's Award Of Temporary 
Total Disability Benefits From December 27, 1983 Through 
August 31, 1984 Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious 
As There Was Conflicting Medical Evidence On The 
Issue Of Temporary Total Disability. 
The Administrative Law Judge awarded temporary total 
disability benefits to the appellant from December 27, 1983 
through August 31, 1984. Appellant claims she is entitled to 
additional benefits through November 30, 1984, based upon the 
report of her treating physician Dr. Gordon R. Kimball. In 
addition to the report of Dr. Kimball, however, the 
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Administrative Law Judge had before him the conflicting reports 
of several other qualified physicians. For example, Dr. Dennis 
D. Thoen, a neurologist who examined the appellant for 
purposes of an independent medical examination, diagnosed 
appellant's injury as a "mild cervical strain" which, as of the 
date of his examination on July 17, 1984, had resolved. (R. at 
19). He indicated that he believed appellant could return to 
light duty work (work not requiring any lifting over 3 0 pounds) 
at that time and that she could work without restriction if she 
would be willing to involve herself in a rigorous physical 
fitness program for three to four weeks. 
Dr. Thoen was not the only doctor who felt the 
appellant's condition was stable enough for her to return to 
work prior to November 30, 1984. Dr. Gerard Vanderhooft, 
made the following statement in a letter to Di:. Wayne Zundel 
dated January 19, 1984, just three weeks after the appellant's 
fall: 
This is one of those difficult cases where the 
objective of [sic] findings do not corroborate the 
patient's subjective symptoms. In a nice way I 
explained this to her and suggested to her that 
she return to work as soon as possible. . . . I 
certainly do not believe that any harm would occur 
if she did return to work, but how much pain a 
person has following a soft tissue injury is very 
difficult to predict. . . . Suffice it to say that 
I would think it would be in everyone's best 
interest for her to return to work as soon as 
possible • • •• 
(R. at 7). And finally, Dr. Walter Reichert, another treating 
physician, indicated that he was going to release the appellant 
to return to work in mid-April 1984: 
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I will release the patient to return to work on 
April 16. . . . She will continue with the 
aggressive physical therapy in the next week prior 
to her back-to-work date at which time I have 
released her for full duty. 
(R. at 15). As can be seen from the evidence presented above, 
there were clear conflicts in the record regarding the period 
of appellant's temporary total disability. Therefore, the 
Administrative Law Judge submitted the matter to a medical 
panel for an impartial evaluation. In its report dated May 11, 
1985, the medical panel found appellant's period of temporary 
total disability to extend from the date of her injury through 
August 1984. The Administrative Law Judge subsequently adopted 
the panel's finding as his own and ordered temporary total 
disability benefits to be paid to the appellant through August 
31, 1984. Because there is competent evidence supporting the 
award which was made, the Commission's order must be affirmed. 
B. The Commission Is The Trier of Fact And It Is 
Not Bound To Defer To The Testimony Of The Appellant's 
Treating Physician Where There Is Other Conflicting 
Medical Testimony In The Record. 
In Point III of her brief, appellant contends that 
where the medical panel report and the treating physician's 
report are conflicting, as in the instant case, the 
Administrative Law Judge should be required as a matter of law 
to defer to the report of the appellant's treating physician. 
This argument, however, flies in the face of the 
well-established rule that the Commission is the recognized 
trier of fact in workmen's compensation proceedings. 
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See Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P.2d 
882, 885 (1965); Clinger v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977). This fact finding role of the 
Commission was acknowledged and the proposition appellant 
espouses specifically rejected in Mellen v. Industrial 
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967). In 
Mellen the applicant sought workmen's compensation benefits 
after suffering a heart attack. The applicant's treating 
physician testified that the applicant's heart attack may have 
been brought on by exertion on the job. The medical panel, on 
the other hand, found it to be the natural result of a 
degenerative condition. The Administrative Law Judge adopted 
the findings of the panel and the applicant appealed. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission stating: 
The Commission is the fact-finder in cases like 
this and in its conclusion in such a case, we 
cannot say that it must reject the panel's canvass 
of the facts in favor of the qualified opinion of 
plaintiff's personal physician. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 799. 
As support for her position that the report of a 
treating physician is entitled to greater deference than any 
other medical evidence, appellant cites severcil social security 
cases. However, a review of those decisions only confirms the 
contention of the respondents that where there is conflicting 
evidence in the record, the Commission is the entity 
responsible for resolving those conflicts and where its 
findings are supported by competent evidence, they should not 
be disturbed. 
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In fulfilling its role as the fact-finder, the 
Commission must not only not defer to the evidence of any 
particular party, but it must weigh all of the evidence 
presented before reaching a final decision. The responsibility 
of the Commission in this regard was discussed in Moyes on 
Behalf of Moyes v. State, 699 P.2d 748 (Utah 1985). Therein, 
the petitioner filed a Writ of Review to set aside an order of 
the Industrial Commission. She alleged in part that the 
Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by adopting 
portions of the medical panel's report in its findings of 
fact. The Court first noted that it is not unusual for the 
Commission to adopt the report of the medical panel in its 
findings and then it stated: 
We have noted, however, that in 'discharging [the 
Commission's] responsibility it [is] the 
prerogative and duty of the Commission to consider 
not only the report of the medical panel, but also 
all of the other evidence and to draw whatever 
inferences and deductions [that] fairly and 
reasonably could be derived therefrom.' IGA 
Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d at 830. 
Consideration of the other evidence does not 
require that the Administrative Law Judge or the 
Commission ignore or rewrite the medical panel 
report if they agree with it and deem it an 
adequate summary of their own findings. All that 
is required is some indication that the 
Administrative Law considered the other evidence 
and that his findings are fair and reasonable in 
light of all the evidence. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 753. It is apparent in the instant case that the 
Administrative Law Judge considered all of the evidence in the 
record before adopting the report of the medical panel in his 
findings of fact. It is also apparent that the conclusions he 
reached are fair and reasonable in light of all the evidence. 
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Various portions of the testimony of each of the physicians who 
attended the appellant are cited in both the original Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and in the Supplemental 
Order. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge made the 
following specific finding with regard to the appellant's claim 
for permanent partial disability benefits: 
The Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings 
of the medical panel report dated May 11, 1985 
that the Applicant did not sustain a permanent 
partial impairment as a direct result of the 
industrial injury. See medical panel report dated 
May 11, 1985, page 2, item 5. Based upon the 
medical records in the Industrial Commission file 
from Dr. Gerard F. Vanderhooft; Dr. Dennis 
Thoen; and Dr. Walter H. Reichert, the findings 
of the medical panel is [sic] accurate and 
correct. 
(R. at 74). (See also R. at 62). The reports of Dr. 
Vanderhooft, Thoen and Reichert indicate no permanent 
partial disability of any kind suffered by the appellant. 
Although Dr. Kimball gave appellant an impairment rating of 
9%, he expressed some definite reservations about his 
findings. For example, in discussing appellant's impairment 
due to her cervical sprain he stated: "^f she has any 
permanent partial disability rating it would be no more than 5% 
for the chronic cervical sprain . . .." (Emphasis added). (R. 
at 36). In a later report dated October 3, 1985, Dr. Kimball 
reaffirmed this 5% impairment rating but he noted that the 
rating was based more on subjective symptoms than on objective 
findings and that it was given "in spite of the fact that there 
[was] no evidence of disc or bony injury." (R. at 56). His 
finding that the appellant's knee problems were caused by the 
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industrial accident was also tentative as evidenced by his 
ready acknowledgement that this conclusion was subject to 
argument. And finally, Dr. Kimball stated with regard to the 
appellant's overall rating: "This might give her a total 
overall disability rating of 9% of the whole man as a result of 
the industrial accident." (R. at 36). 
The only other report giving the appellant a ratable 
impairment was the medical panel report. However, it found her 
total impairment to be only 2% of the whole man. Furthermore, 
it found the entire 2% impairment to be the result of 
pre-existing congenital problems affecting her knees. The 
appellant was not found to have suffered any impairment as a 
result of cervical sprain. The medical panel's finding in this 
regard does not appear to be unreasonable in view of the 
qualified findings of the appellant's own treating physician 
and in view of the fact that no other treating physician felt 
appellant had suffered any impairment at all. Furthermore, 
where the appellant did not complain of knee pain until 
approximately ten months after the industrial accident 
occurred, and where Dr. Kimball admitted that his conclusion 
that appellant's knee problems were caused by the accident was 
arguable, it was not arbitrary for the Commission to adopt the 
medical panel's finding of no impairment attributable to the 
industrial accident. 
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C. Appellant Is Not Entitled To Benefits From 
The Second Injury Fund For The Pre-existing 
Condition Of Her Knees Because Her Impairment Was 
Not Greater After The Industrial Accident 
As previously noted, the medical panel assigned to 
evaluate the appellant's condition found her to have a 2% whole 
body impairment as a result of "congenital or developmental 
symmetrical spurring of articular surfaces of the patellas." 
(R. at 42). The panel also found that the entire 2% was 
attributable to pre-existing conditions. These findings were 
adopted by the Administrative Law Judge and appellant now 
contends she is entitled to benefits from the Second Injury 
Fund for this pre-existing impairment. Second Injury Fund 
participation is governed by U.C.A., §35-1-69. That 
section reads in part as follows: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, 
or congenital causes, sustains an industrial 
injury for which either compensation or medical 
care, or both, is provided by this chapter that 
results in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have incurred 
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, 
or which aggravates or is aggravated by such 
pre-existing incapacity, compensation, medical 
care and other related items as outlined in Section 
35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of the 
combined injuries, but the liability of employer 
for such compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be for the industrial injury 
only. (Emphasis added). 
It is apparent after reading §35-1-69 that the 
Second Injury Fund is only liable for benefits where the 
industrial injury results in a permanent incapacity after the 
accident which is substantially greater than the incapacity the 
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applicant would have had if he/she had not had the 
pre-existing condition. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 709 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985) 
("Second Injury Fund Liability is imposed, not when the second 
injury itself causes a 'substantially greater' incapacity, but 
when the worker's total incapacity following the second injury 
is 'substantially greater' than it would have been but for the 
pre-existing incapacity."). In the instant case, the 
Administrative Law Judge determined that the industrial 
accident of December 27, 1983, did not cause the appellant to 
suffer any additional impairment. Thus, her impairment after 
the accident was the same as it was before the accident. Under 
these circumstances, appellant does not meet the threshold 
requirement for triggering Second Injury Fund participation. 
Appellant further contends there is no evidence in 
the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding 
that the condition of claimant's knees was only temporarily 
aggravated by the industrial accident. However, a review of 
Dr. Chester Powell's consultation report proves otherwise. 
For example, after reviewing the x-rays of appellant's knees, 
Dr. Powell noted that the changes seen were minimal, were old 
and were suggestive of a developmental abnormality. (R. at 46, 
47). He also stated that there were no current clinical 
findings affecting appellant's knees at the time of his 
examination and that she was not in continual discomfort as a 
result of her knee problems. He then concluded: 
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It is reasonable in retrospect to consider that 
Mrs. Rushton sustained some degree of a cervical 
strain and perhaps a contusion of her knees but 
the circumstances of the accident and the described 
character of the x-ray changes of the knees 
suggests these are more probably developmental 
changes and not attributable to that specific 
accident. (Emphasis added). 
(R. at 47). Furthermore, although appellant alleges the 
medical panel made a definite finding that the industrial 
accident aggravated her knee condition, in reality it found as 
follows: 
It is possible the circumstances of the accident 
activated a symptomatic phase of the changes seen 
in the knees. (Emphasis added). 
(R. at 42). It is apparent, after reviewing the complete 
finding, that it was not definitely concluded by the panel that 
appellant's knees were, in fact, aggravated by her fall. The 
evidence that Dr. Powell, chairman of the medical panel, found 
only that appellant may have suffered a possible bruising of 
her knees due to her fall together with the evidence that 
appellant failed to report any problems with her knees for ten 
months following the accident, lends support to the 
Administrative Law Judge's finding that any aggravation 
possibly suffered by the appellant was only temporary. Even if 
the Administrative Law Judge acted improperly in finding 
appellant's condition to have been temporarily aggravated by 
the industrial accident, however, the outcome remains the same 
for appellant was not found to have a "substantially greater" 
total incapacity following the accident. Rather her incapacity 
before and after remained the same. Thus Second Injury Fund 
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participation is not warranted and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge to this effect should be affirmed. 
II. RULE 1.1.10 OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION RULES 
AND REGULATIONS PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 1984, 
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO WHICH COUNSEL FOR 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED 
U.C.A., §35-1-87 grants to the Commission the 
authority to regulate and fix the fees of attorneys 
representing applicants in Industrial Commission cases. Rule 
1.1.10 of the Worker's Compensation Rules and Regulations -
Procedure Effective August 17, 1984 was adopted pursuant to the 
authority granted in §35-1-87. Rule 1.1.10 indicates that 
an applicant's counsel is entitled receive fees in accordance 
with the schedule set forth therein although some discretion 
may be used by the Administrative Law Judge if the fees under 
the schedule would be unconscionable to either the applicant or 
his counsel. The provision of the schedule applicable in the 
instant case provides that an applicant's counsel is entitled 
to receive "20% of weekly compensation generated for the first 
$15,000. . . . " In the instant case the only compensation 
generated by appellant's attorney over and above the 
compensation that had already been paid to the applicant prior 
to the filing of her Application for Hearing was temporary 
total disability benefits from August 27, 1984 to August 31, 
1984. Therefore appellant's attorney is entitled to 20% of the 
total of four days of temporary total disability benefits 
unless the Administrative Law Judge in his discretion 
determines other fees are appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Findings of the Industrial Commission cannot be 
overturned in the absence of a showing that they are arbitrary 
and capricious. Where the findings of the Industrial 
Commission are supported by substantial competent evidence they 
are not arbitrary and capricious. As the trier of fact the 
Commission is entitled to weigh all of the evidence before it 
and to assess the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses 
in making its findings. The Commission followed this procedure 
in the instant case and there is ample evidence in the record 
to sustain its findings, therefore, its order of December 31, 
1984 should be affirmed. 
>&Zt_ RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^£2__ daY o f August, 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
AND NELSON 
W. Brandt 
Stephanie A. Mailory 
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